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There are many situations today in which settlors intentionally retain
a taxable power over property that they have transferred but still set up
their estates in such a way that estate taxes are avoided. Such schemes
obviously defeat the purposes of the federal estate tax. In dealing with
crossed trusts, the courts, therefore, should insure that the purposes of
the estate tax are met by applying the reciprocal trusts doctrine rather than
the statutory scheme when by such action estate-tax evasion can be
thwarted. When taxation under the statutory scheme would adequately
meet the policies behind the estate tax, this method should be followed,
just as justice Douglas has suggested, even though the reciprocal trusts
doctrine could be invoked. But when following the statutory scheme
would result in estate-tax avoidance, Justice Douglas' reasoning should
be abandoned and taxation imposed under the reciprocal trusts doctrine.
It is important to realize that application of the above principles
does not require a consideration of possible tax-avoidance motives of the
settlor-a line of inquiry ruled out in Grace as a controlling factor in
deciding when the reciprocal trusts doctrine should apply. Rather, adoption of these principles would be in accordance with the majority's
admonition to look to the objective factors in the case. One of these
factors should be whether there are tax-evasion consequences because
the trusts are reciprocal. If there are no tax-evasion consequences, and
taxation is possible under the statutory scheme, courts should not invoke
the reciprocal trusts doctrine, but should allow taxation under the
applicable statute.
J. DAVID JAMES

Federal Jurisdiction-Suits Against Federal Officers for Violation
of the Fourth Amendment
When an individual is injured at the hands of federal officers conducting an unlawful search and seizure in violation of the fourth amendment, what redress does the law provide for injuries to his person and
to his property? Clearly, the Federal Tort Claims Act1 would not provide
compensation for the plaintiff because immunity to the government from
suit2 is specifically granted by the Act for the very injuries that a plaintiff
The Federal Tort Claims Act is scattered throughout 28 U.S.C. (1964).
2 Cf. West v. Cabell, 153 U.S. 78 (1894),
a case in which a United States
marshal was sued on his bond. A violation of the fourth amendment's proscription
that a warrant shall particularly describe the person to be seized was deemed a
breach of the bond. Id. at 87.
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suffers .as the result of an unlawful search and seizure.3 In order to
avoid dismissal because of tort immunity, a plaintiff should not sue the
United States under the Federal Tort Claims Act for the acts of one of
its agents. Rather, he must forego the "deep-pocket" approach and sue
the officer as a private individual. 4
If the plaintiff elects to hold the federal officer privately accountable
for the injuries that he has suffered, he may bring suit in a state court of
appropriate jurisdiction and rely on the common-law causes of action for
trespass and false imprisonment. However, a federal officer, naturally
desirous of placing himself in a more favorable forum, can easily have
the case removed to a federal district court.' The removal statute perhaps
provides a federal officer with an unassailable haven. It allows the officer
to remove not only when he is sued directly in a state court' but also
when he is sued as a third-party defendant.' Because any one federal
officer can cause the suit to be removed to a federal court, it is not
necessary that other defendants join in the removal petition.' Upon
removal of the case to a federal court, the parties to the suit will be
governed by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure although the federal
court will adjudicate the plaintiff's claim according to state substantive
law.
The primary reason that Congress authorized removal in suits against
federal officers was fear of prejudicial application of local laws.f In
Tennessee v. Davis,"0 Justice Strong reasoned that the operations of the
'Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. §2680(h) (1964), provides tort immunity for "[a]ny claim arising out of assault, battery, false imprisonment, false
arrest, malicious prosecution, abuse of process, libel, slander, misrepresentation,
deceit, or interference with contract rights."
'Presumably, by suing the officer as a private individual rather than suing the
United States, the plaintiff deprives the officer of the tort immunity provided by
the Act. However, the officer can still plead that he was acting under color
of federal law as an affirmative defense.
128 U.S.C. § 1442(a) (1) (1964), provides in part:
A civil action or criminal prosecution commenced in a State court
against any of the following persons may be removed by them to the
district court of the United States... (1) Any Officer of the United States
. .. for any act under color of such office or on account of any right, title
or authority claimed under any Act of Congress for the apprehension or
punishment of criminals or the collection of the revenue.
'E.g., Camero v. Kostos, 253 F. Supp. 331, 335 (D.N.J. 1966).
Goldfarb v. Muller, 181 F. Supp. 41, 43 (D.N.J. 1959) (petition for removal
denied for other reasons).
'Bradford v. Harding, 284 F.2d 307, 310 (2d Cir. 1960).

'Strayhorn, The Immunity of Federal Officers Front State Prosecutions, 6

N.C.L. REv. 123, 124 (1927).
0100 U.S. 257 (1879).
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federal government might well grind to a halt if federal officers could
be tried in state forums without the benefit of federal judicial intervention.11 Chief Justice Taft believed that "[t]he constitutional validity
of [the removal statute] rests on the right and power of the United
States to secure the efficient execution of its laws and to prevent interference therewith ...."2 It should be noted that the federal officer must

demonstrate in his petition for removal that he was acting under "color
of office."'- However, one can expect a liberal application of the "colorof-office" test recently enunciated by the -Supreme Court ;14 as a practical
matter, a motion for remand will not be granted even in the most doubtful
of cases. 15
Given the likelihood that a federal court will ultimately adjudicate a
suit brought against a federal officer, the issue naturally arises whether
the plaintiff may bring suit directly in a federal court alleging that a
violation of the fourth amendment creates a federal claim for relief.
It is clear that if diversity of citizenship exists, suit can be brought under
the appropriate jurisdictional statute,:' but diversity seldom is present in
the typical case. Obviously suit cannot be brought in a federal court on
the bare allegation of a state claim. In such a situation, the federal court
would dismiss for lack of a substantial federal question. Hence, it is
necessary to allege some federal ground in order to generate subjectmatter jurisdiction at the federal level.
In Bell v. Hood,17 the United States Supreme Court dealt with the
question of whether a federal court had jurisdiction to entertain a civil
action alleging a violation of the fourth amendment. The Court held
11 Id.
:"'Maryland
at 263. v. Soper, 270 U.S. 9, 32 (1926).
13

See note 5 supra.

In Willingham v. Morgan, 395 U.S. 402 (1969), the Court stated that:
[T]he right of removal . .'.is made absolute whenever a suit in a state
court is for any act "under color" of federal office, regardless of whether
the suit could originally have been brought in a federal court.
The federal officer removal statute is not "narrow" or "limited." ... At
the very least, it is broad enough to cover all cases where federal officers
can raise a colorable defense arising out of their duty to enforce federal
law.
Id. at 406-07.
1 Compare City of Norfolk v. McFarland, 143 F. Supp. 587, 589 (E.D. Va.
1956) with Tennessee v. Keenan, 13 F. Supp. 784, 791 (W.D. Tenn. 1936).
'28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) (1964), provides in part: "The district courts shall
have original jurisdiction of all civil actions where the matter in controversy ...
is betiveen-(1) citizens of different States ..
1 327 U.S. 678 (1946).
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that there was jurisdiction under section 1331 of title 28 of the United
States Code." On remand the district court dismissed the suit for
failure to state a claim even though it had jurisdiction to hear the case.10
The district court reasoned that the purpose of the fourth amendment
is to protect an individual from governmental action; that whenever
a federal officer exceeds his authority, he no longer represents the
government, but acts in a private capacity; that inasmuch as the fourth
amendment does not apply to private conduct, the violation of the amendment by individuals acting in a private capacity could hardly form the
basis of a claim for relief.20
In the recent case of Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics,2 federal officers entered the home of Webster
Bivens without a search warrant. After a thorough search, Bivens was
arrested for an alleged narcotics-law violation. At the federal court
building he was photographed, fingerprinted, interrogated, and detained
against his will. However, the United States commissioner dismissed
the charges against him. Bivens then brought suit in a federal district
court against the individual officers alleging that his fourth amendment
rights had been violated and that he was entitled to money-damages as a
consequence of this unwarranted federal action. The district court dismissed both for lack of jurisdiction and for failure to state a claim upon
which relief could be granted. On appeal the Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit held, on the basis of Bell, that there was jurisdiction to
adjudicate under section 1331 of title 28 of the United States Code.
However, the court affirmed the district court's determination that Bivens
failed to state a claim.22 The court held that in the absence of a statute
permitting suit in a federal district court, there was no federally created
claim for money-damages inherent in the fourth amendment.It is notable that the court in Bivens explicitly disagreed with the
rationale of the district court in Bell concerning governmental action. 24
The court concluded that action by federal officers in violation of the
fourth amendment amounts to governmental action by any definition of
1828 U.S.C. §1331(a) (1964), provides in part: "The district courts shall
have original jurisdiction of all civil actions wherein the matter in controversy ...
arises9 under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States."
" Bell v. Hood, 71 F. Supp. 813 (S.D. Cal. 1947).
20 Id. at 817.
"1409 F.2d 718 (2d Cir. 1969).
at 720.
2283Id.
Id. at 719.
2
1 Id. at 720-21.
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the term. Although this conclusion might indicate a predilection on the
part of the court in favor of allowing the suit to be maintained, it chose
to abstain in light of Congressional silence on the subject. Arguably, the
court was correct in its decision not to create a claim for relief in an area
in which Congress had not acted. However, Congress has acted to
impose criminal sanctions for abuse of the fourth amendment 5 and, more
recently, has created a remedy specifying money-damages for unauthorized
interception of private communications by electronic eavesdropping devices.2 6 Congress should certainly continue this trend by passing legislation
allowing an individual to bring suit against a federal officer for violation of
the fourth amendment. Not only will firm guidelines thus be established,
but uniformity in the law will be achieved.
In Bivens, the Second Circuit held that the case was not one in which
federal common law should be applied. Rather, the court felt that until
Congress did act, the exclusionary rule, the possibility of injunctive
relief, and resort to the state courts served to vindicate the plaintiff's
interests. While it is beyond the scope of this discussion to propose a
judicially-created claim for relief for violation of the fourth amendment
by a federal officer, the court's rationale concerning vindication of the
plaintiff's interests cannot withstand close scrutiny.
Although the exclusionary rule operates to prevent a person from
being convicted due to the fruits of an unlawful search, it is only
applicable in criminal prosecutions. It does not secure a person's property
from future seizure, nor does it recompense one for damages occasioned
by the distraint. Similarly, while injunctive relief may prevent future
intrusions, it does not remedy the wrong that has been suffered due to
the past actions of federal officers. The court seemingly disregarded that
at the heart of a complaint alleging an infringement of fourth amendment
rights is the probability that there has been an illegal seizure of the
person; i.e., the plaintiff has been the victim of a false imprisonment
and has undergone the consequent humiliation and attendant mental
suffering characteristic of such an experience. It is difficult to see how
" E.g., 18 U.S.C. § 2234 (1964) (executing a search warrant with unnecesary
force); 18 U.S.C. § 2235 (1964) (procuring the issuance of a search warrant with
malice and without probable cause); 18 U.S.C. § 2236 (1964) (searching an
occupied private building without a warrant).
" See generalIy Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, 18
U.S.C.A. § 2520 (Supp. 1970).
"'Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics,
409 F.2d 718, 722 (2d Cir. 1969).
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the exclusionary rule and the injunctive device would provide proper relief
for a plaintiff so injured.
In the absence of diversity of citizenship and a federal statute giving
plaintiffs a substantive claim for relief for violation of the fourth amendment, and in light of the courts' refusal to apply federal common law, is
there still some method by which an individual can bring suit initially
in a federal forum to litigate his state-created claim for relief? Perhaps
one solution would be for Congress to pass a federal jurisdictional statute
under the guise of "protective jurisdiction."2 Such a statute would
allow a plaintiff to bring suit directly in federal court whenever he wishes
to litigate a state-created claim for relief against a federal officer. The
statute would correct two present imbalances. On the one hand, it would
serve to put a plaintiff on an equal footing with a federal officer who can
claim the benefits of the present removal statute. On the other, it would
serve to equalize the plaintiff in a non-diversity of citizenship situation
with the plaintiff who can sue under the diversity statute.
Until Congress does act an alternative solution would be the utilization by the federal courts of the doctrine of pendent jurisdiction in the
interest of judicial economy. Rather than perpetuating inefficiency by
forcing the plaintiff to sue in a state court, only to have the federal officer
remove to a federal court, the concept of pendent jurisdiction could have
been used by the federal courts to retain the case and dispose of it on
state grounds.29
It should be emphasized that, after Bell, the problem facing the
plaintiff is not jurisdictional,"0 but basically one of asserting a claim
upon which federal relief can be granted. Thus the concept of pendent
jurisdiction becomes particularly important and can be used effectively.
The basic theory underlying pendent jurisdiction was set forth by the
"8 In Textile Workers Union of America v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448 (1957),
justice Frankfurter said:
Called 'protective jurisdiction,' the suggestion is that in any case for which
Congress has the constitutional power to perscribe federal rules of decision
and thus confer 'true' federal question jurisdiction, it may, without so
doing, enact a jurisdictional statute, which will provide a federal forum
for the application of state statute and decisional law.
Id. at 473 (dissenting opinion).
" It is interesting to note that the dissenter in Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678
(1946), recognized this possibility. "For even though it be decided that petitioners have no right to damages under the Constitution, the district court will be
required to pass upon the question whether the facts . ..give rise to a cause of

action for trespass under state law." Id. at 686 (dissenting opinion).
"As previously noted, jurisdiction exists under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (a) (1964).
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Supreme Court in Hurn v. Oursler: ' "[A] case where two distinct
grounds in support of a single cause of action are alleged, one only of
which presents a federal question .. . "32 could properly invoke federal
jurisdiction as to both claims. The Court went on to say that "where
the federal question averred is not plainly wanting in substance, the federal court, even though the federal ground be not established, may nevertheless retain and dispose of the case upon the non-federal ground. . .. "33
Taking this statement by itself, it is arguable that pendent jurisdiction
might not be available in a case such as Bivens due to the rigid requirement that a substantial federal question is necessary to justify retention
and disposition of the controversy on non-federal grounds.34 However,
the requirements of Hur have been broadened by the Court's latest
exposition of the doctrine. In United Mine Workers of America v. Gibbs, 5
the Court pointed out that the concept of pendent jurisdiction was
grounded "in considerations of judicial economy, convenience and fairness
to litigants ... ."'I' The Court further stated:
Pendent jurisdiction, in the sense of judicial power, exists whenever
there is a claim "arising under [the] Constitution, the Laws .. . , and
Treaties . . ." and the relationship between that claim and the state
claim permits the conclusion that the entire action before the court
comprises but one constitutional "case." The federal claim must have
substance sufficient to confer subject matter jurisdiction on the
court . . . . The state and federal claims must derive from a com37
mon nucleus of operative fact.
One can only conclude after Gibbs that the standards for the legitimate
exercise of pendent jurisdiction are not as rigid as those set forth in
Hum. Quite certainly the Court still requires that the federal claim have
81289 U.S. 238 (1933).
Id. at 246.
"Id.
,The district court in Bell v. Hood, 71 F. Supp. 813 (S.D. Cal. 1947), thought
that the concept of pendent jurisdiction could not be invoked to dispose of that
case on state grounds because the concept had been applied only in equity cases.
Further, the court held that it could assume jurisdiction over the state claim only
if there was also a federal claim alleged. Id. at 820. This construction of the
doctrine of pendent jurisdiction is clearly erroneous. See generally Mishkin, The
Federal "Question"' In The District Courts, 53 CoLum. L. Rxv. 157, 167 (1953).
See also Wheeldin v. Wheeler, 373 U.S. 647, 657 (1963) (dissenting opinion).
"383 U.S. 715 (1966).
"Id. at 726.
'7 Id. at 725 (footnotes omitted).
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substance. However, more emphasis is placed on judicial economy and
the overriding consideration of complete disposition of a case before a
single tribunal. It may well be that the requirement of substance can
be rather easily satisfied, as the Court indicated, by simply alleging
a claim arising under the Constitution. The Court acknowledged that
there may "be situations in which the state claim is so closely tied
to the questions of federal policy that the argument for exercise of pendent
jurisdiction is particularly strong."3 The situation encountered in
Bivens presents just such a state claim. The federal courts should utilize
the concept of pendent jurisdiction to dispose of such a matter at the
federal level in the interest of judicial efficiency and overall fairness.8"
Pendent jurisdiction is not a panacea for every problem presented by
a case such as Bivens. Admittedly there are some drawbacks to the
doctrine that serve to limit its effectiveness. Primarily, it is a discretionary tool that a federal court can invoke as it sees fit.4" Moreover, an
adverse decision on the state claim by the court can have the preclusive
effect of res judicata. Thus the plaintiff is required to gamble if he
wishes to invoke the concept in a federal court. It is far more advisable
initially to bring suit in a state court since one knows that the federal
officer almost certainly will remove to federal court. The advantage of
this procedure, from the plaintiff's standpoint, is that state law will
definitely apply to the case. The disadvantage is found in the pro forma
8 Id. at 727.
Perhaps one of the reasons that a federal court is reluctant to act in the
absence of congressional legislation authorizing a suit for a violation of the fourth
amendment is the fear of having to establish federal common law. The basis of
the decision in Erie R.R. v. Tomkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938), was to alleviate the
forum-shopping opportunity spawned by the existence of federal common law.
However, in cases such as Bivens, this fear is unfounded because the tort law of
trespass and false imprisonment varies little from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. See
generally, W. PROssER, LAw oF TORTS 54-89 (3d ed. 1964). In any event, it
would seem that in pendent-jurisdictibn cases, state law should be dispositive of
state claims. Although the Erie doctrine is arguably limited to diversity actions,
it has been suggested that the doctrine has been applied by federal courts to state
claims in pendent-jurisdiction cases. See Note, Problents of ParaUel State And
Federal Remedies, 71 HARv.L. REv. 513, 517 (1958).
Another facet of pendent jurisdiction often overlooked is the necessity that
the plaintiff plead his alternative state grounds for recovery. Presumably, this
step was not taken in Bivens. However, had the federal court desired to invoke
the doctrine, it could have allowed amendment of the pleadings in keeping with
the liberality of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See FED. R. Civ. P. 15(a).
0E.g., Massachusetts Universalist Convention v. Hildreth & Rogers Co., 183
F.2d 497, 501 (1st Cir. 1950).

19701

LIABILITY OF LANDLORDS

legal maneuvers in which the plaintiff must indulge."' Congress should
act in this situation to allow an individual to sue directly in a federal
court. However, until Congress does act, a suit that is brought directly
in a federal court should be retained by the court and disposed of on
non-federal grounds under the concept of pendent jurisdiction.
JOSEPH

E.

ELROD

III

Torts-Responsibility of Landlords for Criminal Acts of Third Persons
In Ramsay v. Morrisette' the District of Columbia Court of Appeals
decided that it was appropriate to re-evaluate the scope of a landlord's
duty to protect his tenants from the criminal acts of third persons. The
plaintiff, a tenant in the defendant's apartment house, was assaulted by a
man who broke into her apartment. She alleged that the landlord was
negligent in not taking reasonable steps to protect his tenants in light
of his knowledge of prior criminal activity. Specifically, she alleged that
the defendant-landlord was negligent for his failure to supply a full time
resident manager, to lock the front door, and to prevent intruders from
sleeping in the halls of the apartment house.' The trial court granted the
landlord's motion for summary judgment. The court of appeals reversed,
" Although no pattern has been discerned that will support a hard and fast
rule, a caveat is appropriate at this point. It is notable that in cases in which
removal was allowed, none was found in which the federal officer was found
liable on the claim against him. It would be erroneous to conclude, however, that
the "color-of-office" requirement necessary for removal under 28 U.S.C. § 1442
is sufficient to give a federal officer tort immunity, i.e., to conclude that if the
federal officer was acting under "color of office" sufficient to allow removal, then he
was acting under "color of office" sufficient to allow tort immunity. While a federal
officer can be acting under "color of office" sufficient to allow removal, it is
recognized that his acts may be so in excess of his authority that he can be
held individually liable for them. See Larson v. Domestic & Foreign Commerce
Corp., 337 U.S. 682 (1949), wherein the Court stated:
[T]he action of an officer of the sovereign (be it holding, taking or otherwise legally affecting the plaintiff's property) can be regarded as so
"illegal" as to permit a suit for specific relief against the officer as an individual only if it is not within the officer's statutory powers or, if within
those powers, only if the powers, or their exercise in the particular case,
are constitutionally void.
Id. at 701-02.
See also Willingham v. Morgan, 395 U.S. 402 (1969), in which the Court said
that "one of the most important reasons for removal is to have the validity of the
defense of official immunity tried in a federal court." Id. at 407 (emphasis added).
1252 A.2d 509 (D.C. App. 1969).
'Id.

at 512.

